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Gibbs: The Right to Kill in Resisting an Illegal Arrest

NOTES
THE RIGHT TO KILL IN RESISTING AN
ILLEGAL ARREST
It is uniformly held that every citizen has the right to
resist an unlawful restraint upon his personal liberty. As to
the right to resist an illegal arrest in general, a person may
use such force as is necessary to gain his freedom. State v.
Randall, 118 S. C. 158, 110 S. E. 123 (1921). From this it
is seen that the amount of force allowed must be in proportioi to that which is used by the person attempting to make
the arrest. It would appear from a strict logical interpretation of this rule that such right to use force could possibly
include the right to take the life of the party attempting the
illegal'arrest, if such force were necessary.
It is at this point that the authorities part company.
Most courts hold that the right to resist an unlawful arrest is a phase of the right of self-defense; that as in other
cases of self-defense the person sought to be arrested is justified in taking life only when he has reasonable ground to
apprehend that he is in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm; that killing is not justified merely for the purpose of resisting an unlawful arrest or other restraint upon
his liberty, where the only injury which could be reasonably
apprehended is an unlawful detention for a short time or
other injury short of death or great bodily harm. These courts
hold that an officer attempting to make an unlawful arrest
is simply the aggressor and stands in the shoes of any other
aggressor in like difficulty. A few courts hold that a person
has a right to resist an unlawful arrest, even to the extent
of taking the life of the officer seeking to make the arrest,
if it be necessary to do so to regain his freedom, or if it is
necessary as an alternative to submission. These courts hold
that a person has as much T-igit to resist such an invasion
as he has to resist death or serious bodily harm; that the
right to resist an unlawful arrest and the right of self-defense are fundamentally separate and distinct. Wilkinson v.
State, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711 (1926). Under the majority rule, if the person sought to be illegally arrested kills
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the person undertaking to arrest him, and fails to meet the
requirements for a defense of self-defense, he will be guilty
of manslaughter, unless the circumstances show malice. Mus,coe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 443, 10 S. E. 534 (1890). But
-under the minority rule, it is a complete defense for the defendant to show that it was necessary to kill in order to protect his freedom. Simmerman v. State, 14 Nebr. 568, 17 N. W.
115 (1883).
It is worthy of comment that in 30 Corpus Juris 77, South
Carolina is cited in the footnote therein as supporting the
minority view.
In State v. Davis, 53 S. C. 150, 31 S. E. 62 (1898), Mr.
Justice Pope, speaking for the court, said that the charge
* * * that the law only
of the.presiding judge to the effect
allows the plea of self-defense where the act is done in defense
of life and limb, not in the defense of liberty, * * * where
there is a mere restraint to a person's liberty, it is better
to submit even to the illegal restraint, rather than take the
life of his fellow man" was incorrect, and proceeded to hold
that "one unlawfully arrested may lawfully escape and he
has the right to use as much force as may be necessary tQ
regain his liberty, even to the actual taking of life. * * * tho
right of a man to resist an injury to life or body and the
right to resist an invasion of his personal liberty occupy the
same plane." The court, in laying down this rule, did not cite
any South Carolina case as authority.
But in State v. Byrd, 72 S. C. 104, 51 S. E. 542 (1905),
the court, after holding that the arrest was not illegal, said
"even if the attempted arrest was illegal, an illegal arrest
is usually nothing more than a trespass and does not excuse
a homicide committed in resisting it, unless it appears that
such killing was necessary in self-defense, that is, to prevent
death or great bodily harm". For this statement the court
cited 25 A. & E. Ency. Law, 2ed. 279, and made no reference to State v. Davis, supra.
In State v. Bethune, 112 S. C. 100, 99 S. E. 753 (1919),
the question was squarely before the court, there was a killing and the legality of the attempted arrest was in issue.
IUpon exception by defendant's counsel that the right to resist an illegal arrest is distinct from the right of self-defense,
the court, in sustaining this Xception held that "the right
to resist an unlawful arrest ad the right of self-defense are
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fundamentally separate and distinct. * * * a person may exercise his right to resist an unlawful arrest to the extent of
taking the life of another, if it be necessary, in order for
him to regain his freedom." Neither State v. Davis, supra,
nor State v. Byrd, supra, were cited by counsel or in the
opinion of the court. The court cites a number of South Carolina cases as authority for holding that a person may resist
an unlawful arrest, even to the extent of taking the life of
the aggressor. But a review of those cases shows that they
are authority for the principle that a person has the right
to resist an unlawful arrest, but, in none of them is it held
that a person may resist an unlawful arrest to the extent
of killing the aggressor merely for the purpose of regaining
his freedom or preventing the unlawful detention.
In the lengthy case of State v. Francis, et al, 152 S. C. 17,
149 S. E. 348 (1929), the defendants were convicted of murder in the killing of a police officer which was the result of
an affray which began from an attempt by the officer to arrest one of the defendants. The attempted arrest was held
to be illegal. The court, in disposing of the many exceptions,
had this to say in reference to that portion of the presiding
judge's charge relating to the right to resist an illegal arrest:
"A mere trespass on one's person or liberty is no reason for
the taking of life, and if one commits a homicide while resisting an arrest, even though it is unlawful, he cannot justify
on the ground of self-defense unless he* can show that the
killing was apparently necessary to protect himself from
death or great bodily harm." For this statement the court
cites 25 A. & E. Ency., 279. State v. Byrd, supra, is, at this
point, cited with approval. The court then stated the minority
rule and voiced its disapproval to this view and continued
with the statement " * * * the slayer is not excused unless
he can show that the homicide was done in his necessary
defense. He has no right, according to the better view, to
take human life to prevent a mere trespass upon his person
or liberty, when unaccompanied by any imminent danger of
great bodily harm or felony." It is interesting to note that
although the court cited State v. Bethune, supra, earlier in
the decision in reference to another point, they did not men-.
tion that case when voicing disapproval to the minority view
of the issue under discussion here.
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Then in State v. Robertson, 191 S. C. 509, 5 S. E. (2d) 285
(1939), where the defendant was convicted merely for resisting arrest, the case was remanded for the failure of the
presiding judge to charge the law in respect to resisting an
illegal arrest, since the legality of the arrest was material
issue at the trial. But the court went further and said "the
law as to the right of a person to resist an unlawful arrest'
is well stated in State v. Bethune, where the court lays down
the rule, citing numerous authorities, that a person has a
right to resist an unlawful arrest, even to the extent of taking the life of the aggressor, if it be necessary, in order to
regain his liberty". No mention is made to either State v.
Francis, supra, or State v. Byrd, supra. Bear in mind that
in this case there was no question as to the law charged by
the presiding judge, the question on appeal was in respect
to the failure of the judge to charge.
In view of the existing cases in South Carolina it would
indeed be idle speculation to attempt to say what the law
actually is in regards to the issue under discussion here. It
might be stated, at this point, that the courts which follow
the majority view base their holdings on the reasoning that
the injury to be suffered by an illegal arrest is merely a temporary restraint of personal liberty, that there are sufficient
laws to enable such person to regain his liberty, and, that
illegal arrest is no more than a trespass which is not such
an aggression as may be resisted with death. Such reasoning appears to be sound. But, until the Supreme Court of
South Carolina disposes of this problem with finality, it appears that the door must remain ajar.
JAmES L. GIBBS
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